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Abstract 
Microprudential regulation is an integral part of any banking supervisory framework. By 
analysing the link between economic conditions and the survival of small co-operative 
banks, this study sheds light on the importance of the economic environment after 
assessing individual bank stability over time. The results show that bank failure is better 
captured when we account for the state of the economy both at the national and the 
regional level. Moreover, voluntary closures and acquisitions across provinces appear to 
be related with bank distress. Our findings have important policy implications. First, 
using a wider spectrum of information increases the accuracy of default prediction 
models, improving the supervisory toolbox used to monitor the health of small banks. 
Second, economic downturns increase a co-operative bank’s default risk, supporting the 
introduction of countercyclical capital buffers to lessen the negative effects associated to 
bank instability. 
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1 Introduction  
The regulatory reforms enacted in several countries following the 2007–2009 
financial turmoil have attempted to correct major systemic weaknesses that caused the 
crisis. Policy makers and commentators have advocated the need to develop frameworks 
able to address the financial stability of the banking sector and increase the resilience of 
individual banking institutions during periods of stress. Despite this call, few studies 
have analysed the financial stability of small banks. Microprudential regulation can help 
reduce the risk of system-wide shocks. Consequently, it is paramount to further explore 
the causes of bank distress with a particular focus on local and regional retail banks.  
This paper analyses the determinants of failure among small banks, which are driving 
forces of the economic development in rural areas. In several countries, small banks are 
characterised by the mutual form of ownership. In particular, co-operative banks are 
mutual banks owned by their members that tend to have strong local roots. A change in 
economic conditions can have a profound impact on bank performance and profitability, 
especially when clients are members/owners of the same financial institution. For these 
banks, the incentive to keep lending during periods of financial distress is high, 
triggering self-fulfilling crises for both banks and clients. Moreover, geographic 
concentration exposes small credit institutions to local economic downturns.  
We investigate the relationship between the environmental economic conditions and 
the probability of small bank failure using a sample of all Italian co-operative banks over 
the period 1993–2011. The analysis is of particular relevance for the socioeconomic role 
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of these credit institutions and for potential local-level output losses.1 Moreover, recent 
regulations designed to increase financial stability have established capital buffers to 
lessen the procyclical behaviour in bank lending. We investigate whether this regulation 
is well-rooted under the hypothesis that overall solvency risk for small banks is lower 
during periods of economic downturn. 
There are numerous reasons for analysing the solvency of co-operative banks. First, 
few studies have provided a comprehensive picture of the main determinants of risk 
among small banks. Recent research has examined the determinants of bankruptcy in 
commercial banking (Altunbas et al., 2011; Cole and White, 2012; DeYoung and Torna, 
2013) and the systemic risk arising from global financial institutions (Huang et al., 2009; 
Chan-Lau, 2010), but none has covered co-operative banks. In most cases, scant market 
data is available (e.g., audited financial statements), and much relevant information is 
not disclosed (Fonteyne, 2007), making a thorough empirical analysis of the 
determinants of failure among these credit institutions important. Second, co-operative 
banks contribute to the diversity within the banking industry and to the stability of the 
financial system (Cihák and Hesse, 2007). Third, savings and co-operative institutions 
are often the local engine of economic development (Hakenes et al., 2014) and smooth 
out the effects of tight monetary policy (Ferri et al., 2014). Finally, bank supervisors may 
favour mergers and acquisitions among small banks as an option for distressed credit 
institutions.  It is therefore important to understand whether the target bank2 should be 
considered distressed or not. 
                                                        
1 See, for instance, Ashcraft (2005) for an analysis of the macroeconomic costs at the local level associated with bank 
failure. 
2 We use the term “target bank” to refer to a credit institution acquired or the “passive” intermediary in a merger. 
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Is the external environment a significant predictor of small bank failure? Is the 
banking supervisor likely to find private solutions when small banks are financially 
strained? We address these questions for Italian co-operative banks,3 as these credit 
institutions operate mainly at the local level and are widespread across Italy. In 2014, 
there were 381 locally operating institutions with more than 4,400 outlets distributed 
across the 20 Italian regions.  
We use a discrete-time survival model to show that co-operative failures are related 
to macroeconomic variables and to bank-level fundamentals. Our contribution to the 
literature is three-fold. First, we directly model the risk of distress among small CBs 
rather than large commercial and global banks, focusing on Italian co-operative banks. 
Second, we add macroeconomic factors to bank-specific determinants to estimate the 
risk of default of co-operative banks. By using a wider set of variables, bank supervisors 
can lessen the dependency of off-site monitoring on accounting data, thus improving the 
supervisory toolbox used to anticipate banking crises and allowing them to intervene at 
an early stage of a problem bank. Third, we test whether when co-operative banks are at 
risk of default, the distress is resolved through mergers, acquisitions, or voluntarily 
closures. The results of our analysis can help define and identify small bank distress.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Italian co-
operative banking sector. Section 3 discusses the relevant literature and reports the 
research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and the variables used in the analysis. 
                                                        
3 For expositional convenience, the terms “Italian co-operative banks”, “co-operatives”, or “CBs” stand for: 
1. Banche di credito cooperativo; 
2. Casse rurali; 
3. Casse Raiffeisen. 
Note that Italian banche popolari are not covered in the present analysis since, in terms of governance, they more 
closely resemble joint-stock companies (Fonteyne, 2007). Also, cooperative networks, such as Rabobank Group in the 
Netherlands and Crédit Agricole in France, are different from Italian cooperative banking. 
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Section 5 details the econometric modelling. Section 6 summarises the results of the 
analysis, and Section 7 describes our robustness checks. Section 8 concludes. 
2 The Italian co-operative banking sector 
Co-operative banks (CBs) are widespread across Italy and make up a large segment of 
the Italian banking system, operating primarily at the local level. Of Italy’s 110 provinces, 
CBs operate in 101, and they are located in 2,700 of 8,057 municipalities. As of June 2014, 
Italy had 381 co-operative banks (56% of the 678 total banks in the country), with 4,449 
branches (14% of the total - 31,234), around 1.2 million members, and 37,000 
employees (out of approximately 300,000 employees in the whole Italian banking 
sector).4 At that time, the CB sector granted credit totalling approximately 136 billion 
Euro (market share is 7.3%).5 Moreover, these credit institutions are key players in 
granting credit to specific customer segments and to micro, small, and medium-sized 
enterprises (MSME). For instance, according to Federcasse, the market share of loans 
granted to the MSMEs in June 2014 was 22.5%, to artisan firms was 22.6%, to consumer 
households was 8.7%, to producer households was 17.9%, to nonfinancial firms was 
8.7%, and to non-profit institutions was 12.5%. 
The Italian CBs also contribute to the diversity of the Italian banking system. The 
majority are small, rural credit institutions that specialize in relationship lending. As 
mutual banks, their mission involves providing members with high-quality products and 
services, along with adequate profitability. Decision making is based on the one-person, 
                                                        
4 Source of data: Bank of Italy and Federcasse. 
5 To avoid potential double counting due to credit extended to individual co-operative banks, the figure does not 
include funding granted by second-tier institutions. 
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one-vote principle,6 which leads to conservative risk management and a feeling of trust 
between the local CB and its members and customers. Owners and customers often share 
a long-term perspective towards generating value.  
The Italian Banking Law influences the structure and organization of CBs.7 Shares are 
nontradable since they do not reflect the value of the firm; instead, profits are mostly 
devoted to a reserve fund.8 This feature is particularly important as it limits the ability of 
CBs to raise capital on the market. The banks are linked to the local economy through a 
defined geographic area of competence. Customers and members must be either 
residents of, headquartered in, or have an economic interest in the bank’s geographic 
area. However, since 1993, co-operative banks have been allowed to offer the same 
range of products and services to all types of customers as all the other types of banks 
(e.g., commercial banks).  
The Italian CBs are fully autonomous but cooperate closely through network 
institutions using a two-tiered system. The individual banks are associated with 15 local 
federations that, in turn, are members of the national association (Federcasse). 
Federcasse offers member banks legal, fiscal, and organizational support, along with 
training programs. The regional federations provide technical assistance and internal 
auditing to their members. A “safety net” of three institutional funds guarantees the 
liabilities of the individual banks: deposits are guaranteed through the Depositors’ 
Guarantee Fund (Fondo di Garanzia dei Depositanti del Credito Cooperativo); credit 
rights of bondholders are guaranteed by the Bondholders’ Guarantee Fund (Fondo di 
Garanzia degli Obbligazionisti del Credito Cooperativo); and the Institutional Guarantee 
                                                        
6 Art. 34, Italian Banking Law. 
7 Italian Banking Law (Legislative Decree no. 385 of 1st September 1993). 
8 At least 70% of the annual net profits must be allocated to the legal reserve fund (Art. 37, Italian Banking Law). 
 6 
Fund (Fondo di Garanzia Istituzionale del Credito Cooperativo) assures the liquidity and 
solvency of the member banks through crisis prevention and financial support. In 
addition, three central institutions (Iccrea Group, Cassa Centrale Banca and Cassa 
Centrale Raiffeisen dell’Alto Adige) owned by co-operative banks provide specialised 
products and services to CBs.    
3 Selected literature and research hypotheses  
Our study contributes to the empirical literature that investigates bank stability from 
a micro perspective. A long line of literature has employed a similar approach, using 
individual banks’ balance sheet data, sometimes along with market data, to predict bank 
failure. Prior studies have quantified bank default in two primary ways. First, several 
authors model default by directly estimating overall bank risk (see, among many others, 
Meyer and Pifer, 1970; Sinkey, 1975; Santomero and Visno, 1977; West, 1985; Cole and 
Gunther, 1998; Estrella et al., 2000). Second, others quantify risk via specific measures of 
bank risk. For instance, many recent works have used the Z-Score9 (Cihák and Hesse, 
2007; Mercieca et al., 2007), the ratio of total nonperforming loans to total loans 
(Fiordelisi et al., 2011), or the loan-loss reserves to total assets (Altunbas et al., 2007) as 
proxies for bank soundness. Various covariates are then used to explain bank default, 
such as bank-specific variables, market information, or macroeconomic data.  
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) analyses the role of both micro and macro factors in the 
occurrence of banking system distress in the United States, Mexico, and Colombia in the 
1980s and 1990s. Using panel data and duration models, the author argues that bank-
                                                        
9 The Z-Score is computed as the ratio between the sum of the equity ratio (equity to total assets) plus the return on 
asset indicator (net operating profit after taxes as percent of total assets) divided by the return volatility, often proxied 
by the standard deviation of the return on asset indicator or stock price data (for listed banks only). 
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specific variables seem to capture the fundamental sources of ex-ante risk. The 
introduction of macroeconomic or regional variables enhances the predictive power of 
the models based on bank-specific data only. Männasooa and Mayes (2009) test a 
theoretical framework that uses a combination of macroeconomic, structural, and bank-
specific factors to predict bank distress in European transition economies. Arena (2008) 
suggests that systemic macroeconomic and liquidity shocks not only destabilize the 
banks that were already weak before the crises, but also the relatively stronger banks ex-
ante. This result implies that even strong banks can be affected by negative spill-over 
effects brought by systemic crises. 
A few studies have investigated bank failure in the Italian banking sector and 
specifically among Italian co-operative banks. Fiordelisi and Mare (2013) analyse 
whether efficiency measures are important in explaining the default of Italian CBs. The 
authors use a selective definition of bank failure (e.g., distressed mergers are not 
analysed) and do not examine the macroeconomic environment as a determinant of 
small bank failure. Other works focus on de novo banks and factors that can influence 
their survival.  Maggiolini and Mistrulli (2005) analyse a sample of recently established 
CBs and find that they survive longer when there is less local competition. Moreover, 
they conclude that local real per capita gross domestic product is significantly related to 
CBs’ probability of survival. Libertucci and Piersante (2012) use both survival-time and 
binary choice models to investigate whether capital is an important determinant of the 
survival of Italian start-up banks over the period 1994–2006. The authors show that 
capital is significantly related to both the time to default and the likelihood of default. 
Moreover, market and management variables appear to be less relevant in explaining 
bank survival.  
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To our knowledge, however, no papers to date have assessed whether the local 
economic environment and macroeconomic developments are significant covariates in 
predicting individual distress among Italian CBs. Moreover, no studies have explicitly 
looked into the alternative resolution of individual bank distress by estimating the 
probability of default associated with distressed mergers and acquisitions. This paper 
fills these gaps in the literature and provides insights into the role of the economic 
environment in the failure of individual Italian banks. 
Other studies have attempted to include macroeconomic indicators as ex-ante 
determinants of potential banking problems (Quagliariello, 2008).  From a theoretical 
point of view, banks are exposed to the cyclical development of the economy; thus, 
including macroeconomic variables in predictive models for bank failure should lead to 
better forecasting performance (Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999; Ioannidis et al., 2010). 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. (1997) include macroeconomic determinants when analysing 
bank soundness during the Mexican financial crisis and find that banking sector 
variables significantly explain bank failure, whereas macroeconomic variables largely 
determine the time to default.  Betz et al. (2014) develop an early-warning model for 
predicting the distress of European banks and show that out-of-sample predictions 
improve significantly when bank-level characteristics are complemented by macro-
financial imbalances and banking sector explanatory variables. Nevertheless, it is 
important to accurately define the economic area where a bank does its business. 
Specifically, Italian CBs tend to operate mainly locally. Moreover, the co-operative model 
clearly places clients at the centre of the business, increasing banks’ exposure to the 
cyclical fluctuations of the local economy because their performance is closely tied to the 
financial condition of their customers.  
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A few loosely related studies look at the performance of US regional and community 
banks, explicitly investigating the role of macroeconomic determinants differentiated at 
the macro and local levels. Meyer and Yeager (2001) and Daly et al. (2004) find that a 
variety of measures of state-level economic factors have economically and statistically 
significant effects on measures of bank performance. Meyer and Yeager (2011) also find 
that county-level economic data is both statistically and economically insignificant. 
Yeager (2004) relates measures of performance - the ratio of nonperforming loans to 
total loans, net charge offs to total loans, and return on assets - to large shocks in 
regional unemployment rates and finds that local market risk has a non-significant 
economic effect on community bank performance. Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010) 
compare the characteristics of failed and healthy US banks during 2007–2010 and show 
that bank failures are concentrated in regions with the highest degree of distress in real 
estate markets and the largest declines in economic activity. These studies do not test 
whether banks’ overall risk of solvency is related to macroeconomic dynamics. We fill 
this void by testing whether the default of Italian co-operative banks depends on 
aggregate factors (e.g., short-term interest rate) and regional-level drivers (e.g., 
unemployment rate). 
Hypothesis I (H1): The state of the economy, both at the national and the regional level, 
affects the survival of co-operative banks (“economic vulnerability” hypothesis). 
Alternative Hypothesis I (H1A): The state of the economy, both at the national and the 
regional level, does not affect the survival of co-operative banks (“economic immunity” 
hypothesis). 
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To avoid classification problems,10 some banking studies consider distressed mergers 
as a failure event (Curry et al., 2007; Kick and Koetter, 2007; Betz et al., 2014). The 
Italian Banking Law allows mergers as an option for distressed CBs.11 Because of the 
small size of these local credit institutions, governments and regulators do not take over 
the troubled banks but rather favour alternative solutions.  
In line with this argument and because the literature on Italian bank failures does not 
explore this alternative, we test the hypothesis that the Italian bank supervisor (Bank of 
Italy) favours a change in bank status through acquisition, voluntary closure, or sale to 
other banks in the case of bank failures. We explore whether the Italian banking 
supervisor follows a policy of forbearance or a policy of quickly closing co-operative 
banks.  Moreover, from a modelling perspective, it is fundamental to define in broader 
terms the distress of co-operative banks. 
Hypothesis II (H2): When banks are at risk of default, bank supervisors favour private 
solutions (“private resolution” hypothesis).  
Alternative Hypothesis II (H2A): When banks are at risk of default, bank supervisors do not 
favour private solutions (“market discipline” hypothesis). 
 
4 Sample and variables  
We use data from annual financial statements as well as macroeconomic information 
to investigate the degree of solvency of Italian co-operative banks over the period 1993–
                                                        
10 In order to obtain higher model performance, healthy banks should be as diverse as possible from distressed banks 
in terms of their default determinants. 
11 Article 36, Italian Banking Law. 
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2011. 12  Financial statements are obtained from Federcasse, and macroeconomic 
information comes from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat), the Bank of 
Italy, and Datastream (Thomson Reuters). In 2006, CBs adopted the International 
Accounting Standards (IAS), causing the dataset before and after 2006 to differ. 
Therefore, we divide the sample in two, using 1993–2005 data in our main models and 
2006–2011 data for out-of-sample robustness checks. Moreover, because no default 
events occurred during 2007–2008, hold-out data is restricted to years 2008–2011.13  
After cleaning and organizing the data, we are left with a sample of 4,635 
observations from 434 unique banks distributed across the 20 Italian regions. The 
number of observations per group ranges from 1 to 13. Table 1 shows the participation 
patterns of the cross-sectional time-series data and indicates that data for each 
individual bank in the sample is not available for all the years.  
<Insert here Table 1> 
Table 2 shows the geographic distribution of the banks in our sample. Almost half are 
located in one geographic area (North-East, 42%), and almost a quarter in one region 
(Trentino Alto-Adige, 25%). At the end of 2005, the median asset size of the sample 
banks was €185.1 million, and the median number of branches per bank was 6.0. The 
biggest banks in terms of the average number of branches per bank and of the average 
asset size are located in the North West. Banks located in the South and the Islands are 
smaller, in terms of both average total assets and average number of branches. 
<Insert here Table 2> 
                                                        
12 As in Poghosyan and Čihak (2011), the data set on default events begins and ends one year later than the bank-level 
and economic data sets (i.e., 1994-2012) to account for the relationship between bank distress and lagged covariates. 
13 See Section 5 for a detailed explanation of the difference between the observation period (1994–2012) and the data 
used to estimate the model (1993–2005) and those used to run the out-of-sample test (2006–2011). 
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Previous studies have found that bank failure is associated with public intervention 
(Arena, 2008; Männasooa and Mayes, 2009; Fiordelisi and Mare, 2013). The Italian 
insolvency regime rules that major companies (groups) experiencing financial distress 
can be subject to either special administration or liquidation procedures. Special 
administration is a “going-concern” intervention that aims at restructuring and 
reorganizing the enterprise while protecting the company from creditor action. 
Liquidation is a “gone-concern” action in which the license is revoked by the regulator.  
Moreover, the Italian insolvency regime rules that in case of distress, troubled CBs may 
be merged with healthy banks. This resolution is optional and does not necessarily mean 
that mergers follow distress. Consequently, we do not include this possibility in our 
definition of “failure.” Instead, we limit our classification of a bank in default as one 
entering into special administration (i.e., conservatorship) or compulsory liquidation 
between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2006. This definition indicates either 
temporary instability or a bank's inability to continue its operations. Moreover, defining 
default in this manner leaves us with an adequate number of cases (i.e., 59) to draw 
statistical inference from the data. The explained variable is computed as a dummy that 
takes a value of 1 if the bank is subject to one of the aforementioned procedures in a 
specific year, and 0 otherwise. 
<Insert here Table 3> 
Tables 3 and 4 provide descriptive statistics for our sample of Italian CBs. Table 3 
shows that the number of CBs decreased between 1993 and 2012, primarily due to 
acquisitions and mergers. According to Table 4, of the total number of banks cancelled 
from the Bank of Italy’s register during the 1993–2011 period (444), 86% merged with 
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or were acquired by other banks (380). Moreover, of the 100 cases of default, 61 ended 
with a merger or acquisition favoured by the bank regulator (Bank of Italy).  
<Insert here Table 4> 
The data set for the explanatory variables combines accounting and macroeconomic 
data. We do not consider market information because CBs are not listed on a stock 
exchange, and very little other market information is available.14 We draw a set of 
potential explanatory variables from the extant literature and also take into account 
specific CB characteristics. The covariates are divided into two broad categories: 
macroeconomic factors - both at the national and regional levels - and bank-level 
fundamentals. 
Macroeconomic variables 
The first category of regressors seeks to gauge the impact of the economic 
environment on bank risk. Our underlying assumption is that economic variables proxy 
risk within the environment in which CBs operate. Since diversification is not an option 
due to specific restrictions on CBs’ business activities, adverse local economic conditions 
increase the vulnerability of these banks to local exogenous financial shocks. We 
compute macroeconomic factors at both the regional and national levels to capture the 
heterogeneity of Italian regions and to control for systemic risk.  
Following earlier studies, we examine a broad set of indicators to capture the risk of 
banking crises (Borio and Lowe, 2002, 2009; Davis and Karim, 2008; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2005). After performing univariate tests and employing a stepwise 
procedure, we select three macroeconomic variables to include in the model: the 
                                                        
14 A few CBs are provided with credit ratings by External Credit Assessment Institutions. 
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interstate deposit rate, the unemployment rate, and an indicator of industry 
concentration.  
Our first variable of macroeconomic risk, the three-month average interbank deposit 
rate, gives an indication of the liquidity of the Italian banking market. In recent years, 
when the value of this indicator has been high, there has been higher distress on the 
wholesale banking market, leading banks to rely more heavily on core liabilities (i.e., 
deposits) or on liquidity lines from the central banks. The second variable, the regional 
unemployment rate, helps determine environmental risk. The majority of CB 
customers/members are households and small and medium-sized firms with a local 
business. A high unemployment rate could affect both the consumption and credit 
worthiness of customers, which translates into high environmental risk. Our third 
macro-level variable is the concentration of regional outlets, which indicates regional 
competition in the banking industry. A higher value indicates that CBs account for a 
higher percentage of the total number of regional outlets and consequently face less 
competitive pressure from other types of banks (e.g., commercial banks). 
Bank-level variables 
We are also interested in capturing individual banks’ idiosyncratic risk.  To ensure 
coverage of the most important aspects of bank vulnerability, we follow the extant 
literature and the CAMEL framework15 to devise a set of bank-level variables to help us 
estimate the financial distress of individual banks (Männasooa and Mayes, 2009; 
Fiordelisi and Mare, 2013; Betz et al., 2014). We use bank-level accounting data to 
                                                        
15 CAMEL refers to the following five factors traditionally examined by US banking regulators: “C” stands for capital 
adequacy, “A” for asset quality, “M” for management quality, “E” for earnings, and “L” for liquidity. A more recent 
framework (CAMELS), take into consideration an additional factor: “S” for sensitivity to market risk. However, CBs do 
very little market activity, meaning that market risk is a residual determinant of the overall risk of failure. 
 15 
control for the effects of other elements that provide early warning of distress. These 
ratios provide information about the symptoms rather than the causes of financial 
difficulty (Arena, 2008).  
We again employ univariate analyses and a stepwise methodology to select the most 
relevant variables. Specifically, we measure capital adequacy using the Basel III leverage 
ratio (i.e., equity to total assets). We estimate a bank’s asset quality using the ratio of 
loan-loss provisions to total loans. We proxy management quality using staff costs 
divided by the sum of interest and fee income. We account for earnings using the 
adjusted return on asset indicator (sum of net profit after taxes and loan-loss provisions 
divided by total assets), and we measure the liquidity risk as loans to deposits. In 
addition, we control for the bank’s idiosyncratic risk (Emmons et al., 2004) using total 
assets. Table 5, Panel A defines our analytic variables and lists prior studies that have 
used them. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for failed and healthy banks in the 
training set.16  
<Insert here Table 5> 
 
5 Modelling bank default  
In this study, we examine the relevance of macroeconomic determinants in 
estimating the probability of CB default. We expect that small bank distress stems from 
both internal determinants (i.e., managerial risk) and external conditions (i.e., economic 
                                                        
16 The training set is the data used to estimate the model. 
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environment). Following Quagliariello (2008), we model the probability of default of 
Italian CBs using the following specification: 
Prob(Failure)=f(Bank Specific, Macroeconomic Variables)   (1) 
We estimate the probability of failure at each point in time using a discrete-time 
survival model, which includes macroeconomic variables that are the same for all banks 
at given points in time (Shumway, 2001; Leow and Crook, 2014). Moreover, this 
methodology allows us to capture the change in a bank’s risk of bankruptcy over time 
and to account for censoring.17  We estimate the following complementary log-log model 
(cloglog), which is consistent with interval-censored survival time: 
( ), 1 1 , 1 1 1( , , ) 1 exp exp I Ii j j i j j jh j β δ γ− − − − − = − − + + X M X M  , (2) 
where 
, 1 1( , , )i j jh j − −X M  is the hazard rate or the probability that a bank fails in a given 
time interval. j and i denote, respectively, a time interval and a specific bank; 
, 1i j−X is the 
vector of the time-varying, bank-specific covariates, lagged one year; 1j−M  is the vector 
of the time-varying, bank-independent covariates (i.e. macroeconomic variables), lagged 
one year; and  1jγ −  is the parametric baseline estimated as the log of time. Iβ  and Iδ are 
vectors of parameters to be estimated. The discrete hazard rate expresses the probability 
of exit in a specific interval j, conditional on survival until interval j. See Appendix A for 
further details. 
                                                        
17 In the empirical literature, many other studies employ hazard models in analyzing bank failures such as Lane et al. 
(1986), Whalen (1991), Männasooa and Mayes, (2009), Brown and Dinç (2011), and Fiordelisi and Mare (2013). 
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Following the ex-post empirical approach used in previous bank failure studies,18 the 
explanatory variables (Xi,j, Mj) are drawn from data for a time period prior to failure. We 
compare the characteristics of two groups of banks - sound and default - using a time lag 
to examine dynamic behaviour. The explanatory variables are one-year lagged (Xi,j-1, Mj-1) 
such that the hazard rate expresses the probability of default in period j in relation to the 
control variables of period j-1. The econometric model then predicts the likelihood that a 
bank, currently considered safe and sound, fails within a period of 0–12 months.  
We run a three-stage analysis. First, we estimate a complementary log-log model 
(cloglog) using macroeconomic factors and firm-specific CAMEL ratios, separately and 
then jointly, as explanatory variables. We exclude from the estimation banks that have 
merged, been acquired, or closed by owners. The observation period is 1994–2006, and 
the model is estimated using data from 1993 to 2005, allowing us to investigate whether 
macroeconomic variables are significantly related to small bank failure.  
We next explore whether some of the excluded credit institutions (e.g., merged 
banks) were distressed before the change of status. We compute the hazard rate for each 
bank using the estimated coefficients of the discrete-time survival model for the period 
1994 to 2006 and  then rank all banks from the least risky (1st decile of the hazard rate 
distribution) to the riskiest (10th decile of the hazard rate distribution). We expect the 
banks with the highest hazard rate to be the most likely to fail. We then calculate the 
percentage of banks subject to merger, acquisition, or voluntary closure that are 
assigned to each decile of the hazard rate distribution.  
                                                        
18 Among others, Martin (1977), Espahbodi (1991), Männasooa and Mayes (2009), and Fiordelisi and Mare (2013). 
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As a further test, we analyse whether a subsample of merged/acquired institutions is 
more significant in terms of level of distress. We control for whether the banks that were 
acquired by/merged with an intermediary located in a different province19 were more or 
less risky compared to the full sample. This analysis allows us to test H2, the private 
resolution hypothesis, because it involves the combination of institutions with different 
“local” roots. In addition, we investigate whether there is a statistically significant 
difference between the mean hazard rate of defaulted banks and that of banks subject to 
merger, acquisition, or closure.  
Finally, to determine whether the inclusion of macroeconomic determinants 
improves out-of-sample predictions, we calculate out-of-sample forecasts of the hazard 
rate. We use the estimated coefficients in conjunction with data for the period 2008–
2011 to test the model performance over the period 2009–2012.  
6 Results  
The discrete time survival model relates the hazard rate to internal and external 
conditions that trigger default. The regression coefficients summarise the effect on the 
hazard of absolute changes in the corresponding covariates. Positive values are 
associated with bank failure, and non-positive values indicate survival. We run the model 
using a one-year lag in the explanatory variables and three different specifications. We 
are interested in whether the relation between the macroeconomic variables and small 
bank default is statistically significant. Table 6 shows the results. 
<Insert here Table 6> 
                                                        
19 Note that the Constitution of the Italian Republic (Article 114) states that the main territorial subdivisions in 
ascending order are the municipalities, the provinces, the metropolitan cities, the regions, and the state. 
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The interbank deposit rate is negatively related to the probability of financial distress 
within a year. Although at first surprising, this result might be explained in two ways.  
First, CBs are net contributors to the Italian interbank market; therefore, a higher ratio 
value indicates an increase in CB revenues. Second, CBs do not rely heavily on 
borrowing; hence, the increase in the pressure is mainly born by commercial banks, 
giving a further competitive advantage to CBs. If costs inflate faster than revenues for 
borrowers and for banks, then funding via deposits would be more attractive than other 
revenue streams.  Because deposits are the main source of CB funding, commercial banks 
are at a disadvantage when the interbank deposit rate is high.  
Table 6 also indicates that the regional unemployment rate is highly statistically 
significant and is positively correlated with the hazard rate. When regional economic 
conditions worsen, CBs face a decrease in survival probability. Moreover, in a univariate 
context, this variable shows high discriminatory power, meaning that local economic 
downturns weaken small bank performance.20 The concentration of regional outlets is 
negatively associated with the hazard rate, implying that local competitors may have a 
negative effect on CB performance due to “unhealthy” competition. Co-operative banks 
are prepared to support the local communities, but perhaps higher competition leads to 
more risk-taking behaviour, which CBs are not equipped to deal with (Mercieca et al., 
2007).  These findings support the economic vulnerability hypothesis.  
Turning to the CAMEL-type variables, a high percentage of capital is associated with 
low risk. This relative measure indicates that the larger the capital holdings, the lower 
the probability of distress. The ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans is a proxy for 
                                                        
20 Results of the univariate analysis are available from the author upon request. 
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credit risk. The positive sign indicates that higher risk decreases CBs’ survival. The ratio 
of personnel expenses to interest and fee income gives a relative measure of labour 
productivity. The negative sign implies that higher values for this ratio are associated 
with lower risk of failure. If we assume that highly skilled personnel earn higher salaries, 
a better qualified work force (e.g., management) has a positive impact on CB survival. 
The adjusted return on assets is negatively related to distress; hence, earnings are an 
important source of stability for CBs. The liquidity ratio is positively and statistically 
significantly related to the hazard rate. Liquidity is critical for CBs, as they rely mainly on 
deposits; therefore, the comparison with loans gives an indication of potential future 
problems. The negative sign of the size coefficient supports the traditional view that 
bigger institutions are less likely to fail. For instance, bigger banks are better able to 
diversify their business.  
Crisis management is one of the key functions of bank supervisors. Distress may be 
resolved through a private solution (i.e., merger and acquisition), take over, bail out, or 
closure of the failing bank. Not only is a bank more likely to be acquired when it is weak, 
but also the regulators’ decision to approve or reject an acquisition may be related to 
individual bank health and to the overall weakness of the banking sector.  
Using the estimated model coefficients, we compute the hazard rate for the banks 
subject to merger, acquisition, and voluntary closure. Table 7 reports the results. As 
already noted in other studies (e.g., Betz et al., 2014), in some countries episodes of 
acquisition by other banks may be associated with financial distress. We do not find a 
similar indication for the Italian CBs in our sample that merged or were acquired, 
suggesting that episodes of mergers and acquisitions could be related to the 
consolidation trend that occurred in the European banking market during the 1990s. 
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However, for the subset of mergers and acquisitions for which the active intermediary21 
was located in a different province, the estimated mean hazard rate (Table 7, Panel B, 
2.2%, 31.5%, and 29.5% for the specification with macroeconomic variables only, 
accounting ratios only, and with all the explanatory variables, respectively) is higher, 
meaning that there could be a regulatory intervention favouring the resolution of the 
crisis. Surprisingly, we do not find a similar result in regard to mergers, despite the 
Italian banking law explicitly mentioning mergers as a way to resolve distress.   
We also find a high estimated hazard rate (Table 7, Panel A, 4.2%, 49%, and 56% for 
the specification with macroeconomic variables only, accounting ratios only, and with all 
the explanatory variables, respectively) among voluntary closures, suggesting that banks 
may have been forced to close by the bank supervisor. The results from the mean-
comparison tests show no clear pattern in the episodes of merger and acquisitions, but 
voluntary closures are indeed associated with bank distress. However, the descriptive 
evidence does not allow us to either reject or to fail to reject the private resolution 
hypothesis. 
<Insert here Table 7> 
7 Robustness tests 
We test the predictive ability of our model both in- and out-of-sample to assess how 
well the econometric model fits the observed data. Overall the model shows good 
predictive power both in-sample and in the hold-out sample.  
                                                        
21 We define the term “active intermediary” as the bank acquiring the passive credit institution. 
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Table 8 shows the in-sample check of the model’s performance. In Panel A, we report 
six predictive accuracy indicators: sensitivity, specificity, classification accuracy, ROC 
area, accuracy ratio, and Brier score. Throughout these robustness checks, we classify a 
bank as “failed” if its posterior probability of failure is greater than an optimum cut-off 
point, the level of the sample’s prior probability of failure (see Table 3, sample default 
rate column).  
Panel B presents the accuracy of the estimated hazard rate distribution on actual 
bankruptcies, giving further evidence of the model’s predictive ability (Cole and Gunther, 
1998). The results are in line with previous studies (e.g., Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011; 
Fiordelisi and Mare, 2013) and show that the model does a fairly good job of predicting 
and classifying the occurrence of CB failures in-sample. Moreover, the specification that 
combines macroeconomic information with bank-level fundamentals performs the best. 
<Insert here Table 8> 
We repeat the same analyses out-of-sample because within-sample predictive 
performance is a blurred estimate of population performance. One might argue that 
since we are analysing a period overlapping with the financial crisis, risk drivers may be 
different. Nevertheless, the recent literature focussing on the United States proves that 
not much has changed (e.g., Cole and White, 2012). The accuracy of the performances is 
mixed. Sensitivity, specificity, and overall predictive accuracy rely on the choice of the 
optimal threshold. The default sample average is quite low (0.7%), indicating that the 
model tends to misclassify healthy institutions (i.e., Type 2 error). Looking at the other 
performance measures, the model places actual failures in the highest percentiles of the 
estimated hazard rate distribution. Moreover, the specification that considers all the 
available information outperforms the other specifications.  
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<Insert here Table 9> 
8 Conclusions 
Accurately assessing bank solvency is a crucial element for increasing the resilience 
of banking sectors. Small mutual banks play a key role in the banking systems of many 
countries, and they often drive economic development in rural areas. Weakness among 
these institutions can have long-range repercussions for the wider economy.  Two key 
features set co-operative banks apart from larger commercial institutions. On the one 
hand, co-operative banks are less driven by profit maximization and the bonus culture 
than other types of financial institutions. On the other hand, CBs are strongly linked to 
the real economy, and their unique stakeholder structure may occasionally weaken bank 
soundness. When the economy experiences a downturn, CBs are slow to recover due to 
structural features that affect their ability to cope with crisis situations. 
In this paper, we develop a model to predict default among Italian co-operative banks. 
We use a survival model, estimated using data on bank defaults observed over 13 years, 
that examines how macroeconomic factors help predict small bank failure. We test two 
hypotheses. First, we posit that the state of the economy, both at the national and 
regional level, affects the survival of co-operative banks (economic vulnerability 
hypothesis). Second, we expect that when co-operative banks are at risk of default, bank 
supervisors may favour banks’ change of status through mergers, acquisitions, or 
voluntarily closures (private resolution hypothesis). 
We find evidence supporting the economic vulnerability hypothesis since 
macroeconomic factors, both at the regional and the national level, are significantly 
related to the risk of failure among co-operative banks. Also, using the estimated model 
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coefficients, we document that voluntary closures and acquisitions across provinces 
often mask distress. Nonetheless, we do not find enough conclusive evidence to either 
support or dismiss the private resolution hypothesis, although the bank regulator seems 
to favour voluntary closures and acquisitions of failing banks across provinces. 
Our results have important policy implications. First, models that attempt to estimate 
small bank risk of failure should include macroeconomic factors. Doing so also has the 
advantage of creating a simple framework for stress testing.  
Second, bank supervisors should closely monitor the state of the economy, 
particularly at the local level, to anticipate small bank distress. The Italian economy 
contracted between 2012 and 2014, increasing vulnerability of the country’s banking 
sector. The response of credit institutions has been uneven. For instance, according to 
the Bank of Italy’s 2014 annual report, in 2013 total lending declined by 3.7%, but small 
banks reduced the credit provided by only 0.7%. This discrepancy shows that not only 
may small credit co-operatives be more exposed to the cyclical fluctuations of the local 
economy, but also that they play a positive role in smoothing out the negative effects of 
the ongoing economic crisis. Co-operative banks’ capital buffers are higher than the 
national average (as of June 2014, the common equity tier1 ratio stands at 15.6% vs. 
12%), but the Italian banking supervisor should carefully consider whether this is 
enough to weather a prolonged crisis period.  
Third, countercyclical capital buffers for small banks should account not only for 
lending behaviour (i.e., boom-bust dynamics in lending behaviour) but also for the 
overall solvency risk. The stress test jointly carried out in 2014 by the European Central 
Bank and the European Banking Authority found a capital shortfall of 9.4 billion euro 
under an adverse scenario for the Italian banks included in the analysis. The only co-
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operative bank included in the stress test analysis - Iccrea Holding S.p.A. - was not found 
lacking, indicating high resilience under adverse market conditions. Nevertheless, as 
confirmed by our results, a prolonged period of economic contraction poses severe risks 
for Italian co-operative banks; hence, policy makers and relevant authorities should 
carefully design adequate responses to limit the impact of the potential disruption. 
Recent evidence supports this conclusion: the total number of conservatorships of co-
operative banks over the period 2013–2014 (15) increased significantly compared to the 
period 2011–2012 (5).  
In conclusion, our results show that macroeconomic time series data help to explain 
small bank default. Capital requirements might take into account the impact of the state 
of the economy on the overall solvency risk of small banks. Policy makers should 
carefully monitor local economic conditions for a parallel increase in the tendency for 
inadequate risk-taking or an increase in the overall risk of the co-operative banking 
sector. 
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Appendix A 
A.1. Discrete-time survival model 
We estimate the survival model in discrete time since our data set provides 
observations only annually. We focus on a single state model and assume we have single 
spell data for each bank. Also, we assume that bankruptcy only occurs at discrete points 
in time (t= 1, 2, 3,..., n). Moreover, each bank either fails during the follow-up period or 
survives. We eliminate from the sample banks that merge or are liquidated or for which 
the identification variable (Abi) is not available for the study period. To summarize, the 
following entry and exit events are adopted for the study: bank i enters the analysis in 
year t, which is the later occurrence of a) the start of the study period (1994), or b) the 
beginning of banking operations. Bank i exits the analysis if a) it fails, or b) it survives 
until 31 December 2006. Thus, we consider exits from a single state (soundness) to a 
single destination (failure). 
The random variable T denotes the time to exit from the sample (failure), and t is a 
realization thereof. The discrete time duration model implies that we observe the 
probability of survival of cooperative banks at distinct points in time. Since the sample 
data refers to an observation window of 13 years (1994–2006), the survival time data 
set is right-censored, meaning that we observe the start date of the spell (year 1994 or 
later) but not the total length of transition out of the current state (from soundness to 
failure). We also assume that the process that gives rise to censoring is independent of 
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the survival time process. Moreover, the risk of failure is observable only after the bank 
enters the sample (Lane et al., 1986). The probability of exit within the jth interval is 
( )1 1 1Pr ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )j j j j j ja T a F a F a S a S a− − −< < = − = − , (A.1) 
where a1,a2,…..,ak are the interval boundary dates (years); F(aj) is the cumulative 
distribution function of T (failure function) at time j; and S(aj) is the survival function at 
time j. The discrete hazard rate is the conditional probability of exit in the interval (aj-1, 
aj], defined as 
( )1 1
1
( )
Pr | 1 ( )
j
j j j
j
S a
a T a T a
S a− −
−
< ≤ > = − . 
(A.2) 
The discrete time survivor function is the product of probabilities of not experiencing 
the event in each of the intervals up to and including the current one.  We write it in 
terms of interval hazard rates as follows: 
1 2 1
1
( ) (1 ) (1 ) ...... (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
j
h h k
k
S j h h h h h
−
=
= − × − × × − × − = −∏   (A.3) 
If we allow the hazard rate to vary between banks depending on their characteristics, 
we summarize this information in a vector of variables. Time-varying covariates offer an 
opportunity to dynamically examine the relationship between the distress probability 
and the changing conditions under which the distress takes place. The relationship 
between the hazard rate and the selected characteristics are linked by an index function. 
Following Männasoo and Mayes (2009) and Fiordelisi and Mare (2013), we use a 
complementary log-log model (cloglog) that includes macroeconomic determinants of 
the banks’ conditional failure rate: 
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( ), 1 1 , 1 1 1( , , ) 1 exp exp I Ii j j i j j jh j β δ γ− − − − − = − − + + X M X M . (A.4) 
where 
, 1 1( , , )i j jh j − −X M  is the hazard rate or the probability that a bank fails in a given 
time interval; j and i denote, respectively, a time interval and a specific bank; and 
, 1i j−X is 
the vector of the time-varying, bank-specific covariates, lagged one year. 1j−M is the 
vector of the time-varying, bank-independent covariates, i.e. macroeconomic variables, 
lagged one year; 1jγ −  is the parametric baseline estimated as the log of time;  
and Iβ and Iδ are vectors of parameters to be estimated. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Participation pattern 
The table presents the duration pattern of the banks in the sample during the period 1993–2005. Under 
the column “pattern,” 1 indicates the availability of financial statements for a bank in a specific year such 
that a “frequency” of 160 means that the financial statements of 160 individual banks are available for the 
whole sample period (13 years). For each cross-sectional unit i (banks), we have a different time span, 
meaning that the sample contains unbalanced panel data. This fact is mainly due to a) data availability, b) 
default (as per model definition), c) mergers, d) acquisitions, e) voluntary closures, and f) the date in which 
a bank starts its operations. The sample duration pattern derives from data cleaning and organization 
following the single state approach assumed in the model. 
Frequency % Cumul. % Pattern 
163 37.56 37.56 .111111111111 
160 36.87 74.42 1111111111111 
15 3.46 77.88 .......111111 
7 1.61 79.49 ......1111111 
7 1.61 81.11 ..11111111111 
6 1.38 82.49 .........1111 
6 1.38 83.87 ........11111 
4 0.92 84.79 ...........11 
4 0.92 85.71 .1111........ 
62 14.29 100.00 (other patterns) 
434 100% - - 
 
 
 36 
Table 2 
Distribution of banks, branches, and assets by year and geographical area 
Panel A reports the data on the distribution of banks by year and geographic region. According to the 
Italian statistics institute (Istat), Centre includes Abruzzi, Lazio, Marches, Tuscany, and Umbria; North-East 
comprises Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trentino-Alto Adige, and Veneto; North-West includes 
Liguria, Lombardy, Piedmont, and Aosta Valley; finally, South includes Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, 
Molise, Apulia, Sardinia, and Sicily. 
Panel A: Distribution of banks by year and geographic region 
Region 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Centre 52 75 76 76 76 75 75 84 83 83 80 81 78 
North-East 58 161 160 160 160 160 162 166 169 170 169 169 168 
North-West 49 49 49 49 50 50 50 53 54 53 52 52 52 
South 24 75 81 82 78 75 77 76 76 76 75 76 76 
 
Panel B lists the data on the distribution of the average number of branches by year and geographic region. 
The values are computed by dividing the sum of branches located in a specific region by the total number 
of banks in the region.  
Panel B: Distribution of branches by year and geographic region 
Region 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Centre 4.212 4.280 4.276 4.566 4.829 5.427 5.720 5.810 6.518 7.181 7.313 7.914 6.949 
North-East 3.931 4.031 4.313 4.663 4.975 5.281 5.667 6.090 6.846 7.347 7.740 7.911 8.458 
North-West 5.551 6.184 7.041 7.878 8.280 9.420 9.760 9.604 10.981 11.660 12.404 12.615 13.250 
South 2.125 2.573 2.593 2.841 3.026 3.213 3.338 3.395 3.816 3.908 4.187 4.224 4.342 
 
Panel C summarises the data on the distribution of the average total assets by year and geographic region. 
The values are computed by dividing the sum of total assets of the banks located in a specific geographic 
region with the total number of banks in that region. 
Panel C: Distribution of total assets by year and geographic region (thousands of euros) 
Region 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Centre 106,979 103,435 110,330 128,818 139,439 152,440 164,798 175,064 205,564 223,463 254,984 278,679 253,607 
North-East 69,971 82,254 91,992 105,531 114,487 122,872 131,569 146,452 176,320 209,560 230,076 259,695 281,241 
North-West 170,907 181,858 205,548 237,052 247,469 274,192 283,729 294,494 335,862 373,107 423,671 448,362 486,435 
South 39,681 51,685 50,479 57,534 62,910 67,109 69,289 75,208 88,590 95,040 104,483 109,708 119,496 
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Table 3 
Number of banks, number of defaults, and default rates  
The table summarizes the number of active banks, the number of defaults under the definition used in the 
econometric specification, and the default rate both in sample and observed historically. The figures in-
sample are computed using data from Federcasse. Historical defaults are calculated using data from the 
Bank of Italy. Data from 1993–2005 (4,635 observations) is used for the estimation of the discrete time 
survival model. Data from 2008–2011 (1,658 observations) is used for the out-of-sample test .Source: own 
calculations using data from Federcasse and Bank of Italy. Note that data cleaning and availability 
(identification variable is not available for the whole observation window) have restricted the number of 
banks and defaults in sample. 
 SAMPLE HISTORICAL 
Year NumberI # DefaultII Default rate Number # Default Default rate 
1993 183 - - 669 6 0.90% 
1994 360 3 0.83% 642 10 1.56% 
1995 366 6 1.64% 619 8 1.29% 
1996 367 3 0.82% 591 5 0.85% 
1997 364 7 1.92% 583 8 1.37% 
1998 360 6 1.67% 562 8 1.42% 
1999 364 4 1.10% 531 8 1.51% 
2000 379 5 1.32% 499 6 1.20% 
2001 382 5 1.31% 474 5 1.05% 
2002 382 6 1.57% 461 6 1.30% 
2003 376 7 1.86% 445 7 1.57% 
2004 378 2 0.53% 439 2 0.46% 
2005 374 4 1.07% 439 4 0.91% 
2006 434 1 0.23% 438 2 0.46% 
2007 411 - - 442 - - 
2008 432 - - 432 - - 
2009 416 6 1.44% 421 6 1.43% 
2010 407 7 1.72% 415 7 1.69% 
2011 403 2 0.50% 411 2 0.49% 
2012 - 3 - 394 3 0.76% 
Total 7,138 74 1.04% 9,907 103 1.04% 
I Banks not yet failed. 
II Banks failed in that year. 
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Table 4 
Number of mergers, acquisitions, voluntary closures, and cancellations from the 
supervisory register  
The table provides the number of bank mergers, acquisitions, and voluntary closures among Italian 
cooperative banks between 1993 and 2011. It also reports information on the historical development of 
the mergers, acquisitions, and cancellations from the supervisor bank register. Note that banks subject to 
mergers, acquisitions, and closures are not included in the estimation of the hazard rate. Source: own 
calculations using data from Federcasse and Bank of Italy.  
 SAMPLE 
 
HISTORICAL 
Year 
# 
MergersI 
# 
AcquisitionII 
# 
ClosuresIII 
# 
MergersI 
# 
AcquisitionII 
# 
CancellationIV 
1993 - - - 22 16 43 
1994 1 3 - 11 20 36 
1995 5 7 - 22 17 46 
1996 6 17 - 11 25 41 
1997 9 5 1 10 10 25 
1998 5 11 1 5 19 28 
1999 10 17 1 13 27 45 
2000 16 11 3 20 20 45 
2001 12 10 1 12 17 36 
2002 5 11 1 6 11 20 
2003 6 7 - 6 10 20 
2004 - 4 - - 8 9 
2005 - 3 - - 3 3 
2006 2 2 - 2 2 4 
2007 - - - - 2 3 
2008 - - - 6 5 14 
2009 - - - 2 9 13 
2010 - - - 2 6 8 
2011 - - - - 3 5 
Total 77 108 8 150 230 444 
I Target banks. 
II Acquired banks. 
III Voluntary closures. 
IV Banks cancelled from the public registry held by the Bank of Italy. 
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Table 5 
Variable definitions and summary statistics 
Panel A provides the name, definition, and representative studies along and the unit of measure for the 
variables employed in the analysis. 
Panel A: Definitions of the explanatory variables 
Variable Definition Representative studies Unit 
Dependent variable       
Default 
Binary variable taking a value of 1 if a bank entered special administration or 
liquidation, 0 otherwise. Source: own calculation using data from Bank of Italy. 
Mannasoo and Mayes, 2009; 
Fiordelisi and Mare, 2013; Betz et al., 
2014. 
- 
Macroeconomic factors 
   
Interbank deposit rate 
Average rate on 3-month deposits. High values signal high cost of funding. Source: 
Datastream (Thomson Reuters). 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999; 
Sundararajan et al., 2002. 
Percentage 
Region unemployment 
rate 
Unemployment rates by Italian region. The higher the ratio, the worse is the 
economic conditions of the related region. Source: Istat - Time Series 
Nuxoll (2003); Meyer and Yeager 
(2001); Yeager (2004). 
Percentage 
Concentration of 
regional outlets 
Percentage of CB outlets over total outlets in the region. Source: own calculation on 
data from Bank of Italy. 
Maggiolini and Mistrulli (2005) Percentage 
CAMEL variables 
   
Basel III leverage ratio 
Bank capital adequacy in terms of capitalization level. The higher the ratio, the 
better the bank withstands losses. Source: own calculation using data from 
Federcasse. 
Arena, 2008; Mannasoo and Mayes, 
2009; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011. 
- 
Loan-loss-provisions / 
loans 
Credit risk measure. Higher values indicate higher risk. Source: own calculation 
using data from Federcasse. 
Mannasoo and Mayes, 2009; Arena, 
2008; Fiordelisi and Mare, 2013. 
Percentage 
Staff costs / Interest 
and fee income 
Employee productivity ratio. Higher values denote higher inefficiency. Source: own 
calculation using data from Federcasse. 
- - 
Adjusted Return on 
Assets  
Sum of profit after taxes and loan-loss provisions, divided by total assets. Relative 
strenghts in earnings. Source: own calculation using data from Federcasse. 
Meyer and Yeager, 2001. Percentage 
Loans / Deposits 
Liquidity mismatching. The higher the value of the indicator, the higher the maturity 
mismatch between assets and liabilities, hence, the higher the liquidity distress. 
Source: own calculation using data from Federcasse. 
Lane et al., 1986. - 
Size 
Size effect proxied by total assets (in thousands of euros). Source: own calculation 
using data from Federcasse. 
DeYoung and Torna, 2013. 
Standardize
d 
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Panel B reports the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the analysis for Italian co-operative 
banks between 1993 and 2005. The total number of observations is 4,635, classified as either healthy or 
defaulted banks. The column “t-Statistic” reports the value of the mean-comparison tests in which the null 
hypothesis is that the means of the two groups (sound and default) are equal. The column “AR” 
summarises the information on the Accuracy Ratio (i.e., individual discriminating ability of the variable).    
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
  Y = 0   Y = 1   Univar. measures 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
 
t-Statistic AR 
Interbank deposit rate 4,576 5.263 2.878 
 
59 5.709 2.753 
 
- - 
Regional unemployment rate 4,576 7.903 5.685 
 
59 13.564 5.668 
 
-7.601*** 0.529 
Concentration of regional outlets 4,576 22.786 21.085 
 
59 11.428 9.678 
 
4.132*** 0.366 
Basel III leverage ratio 4,576 0.127 0.037 
 
59 0.113 0.054 
 
2.863** 0.245 
Loan-loss provisions / loans 4,576 0.028 0.090 
 
59 0.091 0.208 
 
-5.186*** 0.050 
Staff costs / Interest and fee income 4,576 0.238 0.066 
 
59 0.234 0.105 
 
0.558 0.149 
Adjusted Return on Assets  4,576 1.075 0.716 
 
59 -0.426 1.752 
 
15.522*** 0.548 
Loans / Deposits 4,576 1.149 0.384 
 
59 1.462 0.608 
 
-6.164*** 0.301 
Size 4,576 166.243 182.049   59 75.894 121.983   3.801*** 0.529 
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Table 6 
Estimation results using one year lag 
This table shows the results of a discrete hazard model with one year lagged covariates. A negative sign for 
the coefficients implies an increase in bank survival. A positive sign suggests an increase in the hazard rate 
(i.e., probability of default). The errors are corrected for potential heterogeneity (i.e., robust standard 
errors). *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Model Macro Accounting Overall 
Dependent variable Default (Y) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Interbank deposit rate -0.334*** (0.037)     -0.138*** (0.050) 
Region unemployment rate 0.032*** (0.012)     0.047** (0.023) 
Concentration of regional outlets -0.059** (0.026)     -0.040** (0.017) 
Basel III leverage ratio 
  
-10.237*** (2.975) -9.767*** (2.954) 
Loan-loss-provisions / loans 
  
2.724*** (0.933) 1.876* (0.980) 
Staff costs / Interest and fee income 
  
-10.633*** (1.951) -9.737*** (1.970) 
Adjusted Return on Assets  
  
-1.157*** (0.102) -1.103*** (0.116) 
Loans / Deposits 
  
1.007*** (0.247) 1.342*** (0.239) 
Size 
  
-0.008** (0.004) -0.005* (0.003) 
Baseline hazard -1.397*** (0.121) -0.323* (0.183) -0.404* (0.228) 
No. of banks 434 434 434 
Observations 4,635 4,635 4,635 
No. of defaults 59 59 59 
Default rate 1.27% 1.27% 1.27% 
Log pseudolikelihood -301.7 -217.6 -202.10 
 
 
 
 42 
Table 7 
Model goodness-of-fit for mergers, acquisitions, and voluntary closures 
Panel A ranks the banks using the estimated hazard rate, from the least risky to the riskiest. The hazard 
rate is computed using the estimated coefficients for the variables in the model using different 
specifications (i.e., macro, accounting, and all information) for the banks in sample between 1993 and 
2005. This permits us to rank banks subject to mergers, acquisitions, and voluntary closures during the 
period 1994–2006 (77, 108, and 8, respectively) into the deciles of the hazard rate distribution of the 
whole sample. We separately report the mean hazard rates for banks subject to merger, acquisition, and 
closure (row mean hazard). We also report the p-value of the mean-comparison tests (row t-test), in which 
the null hypothesis is that the mean hazard rate of defaulted banks and the mean hazard rates of banks 
subject to merger, acquisition, and closure are the same. 
Panel A: Estimated hazard rate for banks subject to M&A and voluntary closure 
Decile Macro Accounting Overall 
  Merger Acq. Closure Merger Acq. Closure Merger Acq. Closure 
1-5 0.299 0.509 0.000 0.506 0.176 0.000 0.377 0.519 0.000 
6 0.221 0.065 0.000 0.065 0.083 0.125 0.078 0.065 0.000 
7 0.156 0.148 0.125 0.078 0.120 0.000 0.156 0.130 0.000 
8 0.091 0.102 0.125 0.143 0.139 0.000 0.130 0.117 0.125 
9 0.182 0.074 0.375 0.130 0.157 0.000 0.195 0.143 0.000 
10 0.052 0.102 0.375 0.078 0.324 0.875 0.065 0.429 0.875 
Mean hazard 0.014 0.015 0.042 0.020 0.136 0.490 0.015 0.117 0.560 
Mean hazard (default) 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.237 0.237 0.237 
t-Statistic 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.536 0.000*** 0.063* 0.051* 0.000*** 0.012** 0.016** 
# 77 108 8 77 108 8 77 108 8 
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Panel B ranks the banks using the estimated hazard rate from the least risky to the riskiest. The analysis 
only includes banks targeted by or acquired from an intermediary located in a different province. The 
hazard rate is computed using the estimated coefficients for the variables in the model using different 
specifications (i.e., macro, accounting, and all information) for the banks in the sample between 1993 and 
2005. This permits us to rank banks subject to mergers and acquisitions during the period 1994–2006 (8 
and 32, respectively) into the deciles of the hazard rate distribution of the whole sample. We separately 
report the mean hazard rates for banks subject to merger, acquisition, and closure (row mean hazard). We 
also report the p-value of the mean-comparison tests (row t-test), in which the null hypothesis is that the 
mean hazard rate of defaulted banks and the mean hazard rates of banks subject to merger, acquisition, 
and closure are the same.  
Panel B: Estimated hazard rate for banks subject to M&A across provinces 
Decile Macro Accounting Overall 
  Merger Acq. Merger Acq. Merger Acq. 
1-5 0.222 0.219 0.222 0.156 0.222 0.094 
6 0.444 0.188 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.031 
7 0.000 0.219 0.111 0.031 0.111 0.063 
8 0.000 0.094 0.333 0.063 0.222 0.125 
9 0.222 0.125 0.111 0.125 0.222 0.063 
10 0.111 0.156 0.222 0.594 0.222 0.625 
Mean hazard 0.015 0.022 0.017 0.315 0.014 0.295 
Mean hazard (default) 0.033 0.033 0.230 0.230 0.237 0.237 
t-Statistic 0.179 0.178 0.066* 0.291 0.048** 0.455 
# 9 32 9 32 9 32 
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Table 8 
Predictive accuracy: in-sample performance 
Panel A reports the measures of predictive power of the model in-sample. “Sensitivity” measures the 
proportion of banks in default that are correctly identified as such. “Specificity” quantifies the proportion 
of safe banks (e.g., healthy) that are correctly identified. These two indicators are closely related to the 
concepts of type I and type II errors. The “overall predictive” power is the ratio of the sum of all safe and 
failed banks accurately identified to the total number of banks. The “ROC curve” quantifies the impact of 
changes in the probability threshold, e.g. the decision point used by the model for classification. The 
“accuracy ratio” measures the discriminating ability of a binary classification model: the larger its value, 
the higher the likelihood that an actual default case will be assigned a higher probability of default than an 
actual non-default case. The “Brier score” ranges between 0 and 1. The closer it is to zero, the better the 
forecast of default probabilities.  
Panel A: goodness-fit indicators 
Measure Macro Accounting Overall 
Sensitivity 0.559 0.864 0.847 
Specificity 0.691 0.820 0.843 
Overall predictive 0.690 0.821 0.843 
ROC area 0.733 0.904 0.926 
Accuracy ratio 0.466 0.809 0.852 
Brier score 0.013 0.010 0.010 
 
Panel B ranks the banks using the estimated hazard rate from the least risky (1st decile) to the riskiest (10th 
decile). The table shows in which decile of the hazard rate distribution the failed banks are ranked. 
Panel B: Probability rankings versus actual bankruptcies 
Decile Macro Accounting Overall 
1-5 0.203 0.051 0.051 
6 0.102 0.000 0.000 
7 0.136 0.017 0.017 
8 0.034 0.068 0.034 
9 0.153 0.153 0.102 
10 0.373 0.712 0.797 
# Default 59 59 59 
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Table 9 
Model goodness-of-fit: out-of-sample performance 
Panel A reports the measures of predictive power of the model out-of-sample. “Sensitivity” measures the 
proportion of banks in default that are correctly identified as such. “Specificity” quantifies the proportion 
of safe banks (e.g., healthy) that are correctly identified. These two indicators are closely related to the 
concepts of type I and type II errors. The “overall predictive” power is the ratio of the sum of all safe and 
failed banks accurately identified to the total number of banks. The “ROC curve” quantifies the impact of 
changes in the probability threshold, e.g. the decision point used by the model for classification. The 
“accuracy ratio” measures the discriminating ability of a binary classification model: the larger its value, 
the higher the likelihood that an actual default case will be assigned a higher probability of default than an 
actual non-default case. The “Brier score” ranges between 0 and 1. The closer it is to zero, the better the 
forecast of default probabilities. 
Panel A: goodness-fit indicators 
Measure Macro Accounting Overall 
Sensitivity 1.000 0.667 0.778 
Specificity 0.232 0.645 0.605 
Overall predictive 0.240 0.645 0.607 
ROC area 0.606 0.734 0.786 
Accuracy ratio 0.211 0.467 0.572 
Brier score 0.016 0.031 0.025 
 
Panel B ranks the banks using the estimated hazard rate from the least risky (1st decile) to the riskiest (10th 
decile). The table shows in which decile of the hazard rate distribution the failed banks are ranked. 
Panel B: Probability rankings versus actual bankruptcies 
Decile Macro Accounting Overall 
1-5 0.389 0.167 0.111 
6 0.167 0.111 0.111 
7 0.056 0.056 0.111 
8 0.111 0.167 0.000 
9 0.111 0.111 0.222 
10 0.167 0.389 0.444 
# Default 18 18 18 
 
